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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES



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AUSTRIAN TREATY




NIE-21

Published 22 January 1951



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/24: CIA-RDP79R01012A000500010001-6

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

AUSTRIAN TREATY

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The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 18 January 1951.

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AUSTRIAN TREATY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate whether Austria is likely to maintain its independence and security against internal and external pressures for at least one year after the withdrawal of all forces of occupation.

ASSUMPTION

That the USSR abandons within approximately three months its recent tactics of obstruction and agrees to the conclusion of an Austrian treaty along the lines already indicated as acceptable to the US,* providing for a withdrawal of all occupation troops ninety days after the ratification of the treaty.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1. Austria will probably maintain its security and independence against the internal and external pressure other than overt aggression it is likely to encounter for at least one year after the withdrawal of occupation forces, provided the US continues to give economic and political support and, with Austrian cooperation, implements its plan to provide military equipment after conclusion of the treaty.
- 2. Austria would not be able during this period to defend its territory against invasion by armed forces of the Soviet Satellites, but we believe such invasion is likely only if the Soviets estimate that Western reaction would not lead to the precipitation of general hostilities, or if the Soviets had already made a decision to accept a global war.


DISCUSSION

GENERAL STABILITY OF THE AUSTRIAN REGIME.

1. The present Austrian Government and the vast majority of the Austrian people are firmly anti-Communist and will be strongly disposed to preserve the independence, integrity, and pro-Western orientation of the country. The police force, even in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, is loyal to the government. The organized labor movement is tightly controlled by the Socialist Party, which has long been hostile to Communism. No Communists sit in the Cabinet, and only five in the Parliament.

2. The continuance of a pro-Western regime in Austria will require US economic and po-

litical support. Austria cannot soon become self-supporting at an acceptable standard of living. An early cessation of US assistance would cause serious deterioration of the economic situation and resulting disturbances of political stability. The existence of the coalition government would be threatened, since the Socialists might be obliged to withdraw from it in order to avoid losing considerable segments of their labor support to extremist movements, especially to the Communists. The People's Party might also face the loss of some of its followers, mainly to the extreme right-wing parties. Withdrawal of US political support would permeate the country



^{*}See Annex.



with a feeling of helplessness, cause the rise of a sentiment for neutralism, and perhaps eventually lead a future Austrian Government to come to terms with the Eastern bloc. This deterioration would not necessarily reach completion within one year, but the trends would certainly become evident.

SECURITY FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT.

- 3. Austrian police and gendarmerie forces scattered throughout the country now number about 27,500. Before the middle of 1951 there should, and possibly will, be available a mobile national gendarmerie regiment consisting of three 500-man battalions trained and equipped for light infantry action. These police forces together would be capable of controlling sporadic local disorders; they would not be capable of maintaining internal security against major disturbances or a succession of coordinated disorders, or of mounting any effective border control.
- 4. Existing plans call for training in rotation through the gendarmerie regiment, before the signature of the treaty, a gendarmerie reserve numbering up to 10,000 men. Upon the ratification of the treaty, this reserve would constitute the initial strength of the legal Austrian Army. The plans further provide for expansion of this force to a strength of 28,000 during the ninety days between ratification of the treaty and withdrawal of occupation forces. MDAP aid for equipping this number would be forthcoming. The strength of 28,-000 is generally considered the minimum required for adequate maintenance of internal security and border control, as well as the maximum which the Austrian economy could initially support. Partly for fear of Soviet displeasure and partly because of internal political differences, the Austrian Government has been reluctant to push ahead with the implementation of the plans. It is expected, however, that the contemplated force of 28,-000 men will be available when the occupation troops withdraw.
- 5. Plans have also been worked out for the US to equip and train an Austrian Air Force of treaty strength—90 planes and up to 5,000

personnel. It is not expected that this Austrian Air Force will constitute a force in being capable of affording major aid to Austrian ground forces in the mission of maintaining internal security during the time covered by this estimate.

Possible Threats to Austrian Security and Independence.

- 6. The Austrian Communist Party has a membership estimated at 100,000. It polled less than 215,000 votes—5 percent of the total in the national elections of October 1949. The Werkschutz organization of factory guards in the Soviet Zone of Occupation is the nearest approximation to a Communist paramilitary force which exists; it is estimated to have a membership of 2,000 and a trained reserve of several times that number. The Communist Party in general is at present incapable, without extensive Soviet support, of fomenting major industrial unrest or of carrying out any sustained action against the government, and there is no reason to expect any substantial increase in its capabilities during the first year after withdrawal of the occupation troops. We believe that during that year the Austrian Communist Party will possess neither the numbers, the organization, nor the leadership capable of achieving a position of power in the country, unless it should receive support from across the borders on a scale approaching open invasion, which could hardly be kept covert.
- 7. Under Article 35 of the projected treaty, the USSR receives as German assets oil and shipping properties in Eastern Austria as well as exploration rights in certain oil-bearing areas. While these properties are to remain subject to Austrian law, the concessions nevertheless constitute a limitation of Austrian sovereignty. The Kremlin could exploit this situation: (a) to bring political pressures on the Austrian Government for alleged violations of Soviet property rights; (b) to use the Soviet properties for subversive activities of all types: smuggling Communist leaders in and out of the country; training paramilitary formations; preparing acts of sabotage; establishing arms caches, etc.



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Soviet exploitation of this situation, mainly because of the weakness of the Austrian Communist Party, is not likely to endanger Austrian security during the first year after the withdrawal of occupation forces. In the long run, Soviet possession of these properties and their use as bases for subversive activities may well present a serious security problem to the Austrian Government.

8. The Austrian armed forces would certainly not be able to withstand an invasion by the armed forces of Soviet Satellites. At the present time, however, there is no buildup of "justification" for overt military attack, the Hungarian and Czechoslovak armies are being reorganized, and Satellite troop dispositions do not indicate early attack on Austria.

Nevertheless, the Soviets are capable of developing propaganda "justification" swiftly, and full readiness or lengthy advance indications by Satellite forces would not be necessary, owing to the relative weakness of Austrian security forces during the period covered by this estimate. Although a direct military attack by the Satellites upon Austria would almost certainly provoke counter action by the West, the Soviets might estimate that such reaction would be slow, limited, and indecisive. We believe that such a Satellite attack would be made only with the full approval of the USSR, and only if the Soviets estimate that Western reaction would not lead to the precipitation of general hostilities, or if the Soviets had already made a decision to accept a global war.

ANNEX

PROVISIONS OF THE PROJECTED AUSTRIAN TREATY HAVING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Article 2

PRESERVATION OF AUSTRIA'S INDEPENDENCE

1. The Allied and Associated Powers declare that they will respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria as established under the present Treaty.

PART II MILITARY AND AIR CLAUSES

SECTION I

Article 17

LIMITATION OF AUSTRIAN ARMED FORCES

- 1. The maintenance of land and air armaments and fortifications shall be closely restricted to meeting tasks of an internal character and local defense of frontiers. In accordance with the foregoing Austria is authorized to have armed forces consisting of not more than:
- (a) A land army, including frontier guards, antiaircraft troops, gendarmerie and river gendarmerie with a total strength of 53,000;
- (b) An air force of 90 aircraft including reserves, of which not more than 70 may be combat types of aircraft, with a total personnel strength of 5,000. Austria shall not possess aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb carrying facilities;
- (c) These strengths shall in each case include combat, service and overhead personnel.
- 2. Austria undertakes not to reestablish any military installations or fortifications which were destroyed in accordance with the instructions of the Allied Commission for Austria.

3. The number and size of aerodromes should correspond strictly to the tasks of the Austrian air force and to the requirements of civil aviation in Austria.

Article 19

PROHIBITION OF MILITARY TRAINING

Personnel not included in the Austrian army or air force shall not receive any form of military training or military air training as defined in Annex 1.

SECTION II

Article 21

PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL WEAPONS

Austria shall not possess, construct or experiment with—(i) Any atomic weapon, (ii) any other major weapon adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction and defined as such by the appropriate organ of the United Nations, (iii) any self-propelled or guided missile or apparatus connected with their discharge or control, (iv) sea mines, (v) torpedoes capable of being manned, (vi) submarines or other submersible craft, (vii) motor torpedo boats, (viii) specialized types of assault craft, (ix) guns with a range of more than 30 kilometers, (x) asphyxiating, vesicant or poisonous materials or biological substances in quantities greater than, or of types other than, are required for legitimate civil purpose, or any apparatus designed to produce, project or spread such materials or substances for war purposes.

The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to add to this Article prohibitions of any weapons which may be evolved as a result of scientific development.



Article 28

Prohibition of German and Japanese Civil Aircraft

Austria shall not acquire or manufacture civil aircraft which are of German or Japanese design or which embody major assemblies of German or Japanese manufacture or design.

Article 30

DURATION OF LIMITATIONS

Each of the military and air clauses of the present Treaty will remain in force until modified in whole or in part by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria or, after Austria becomes a member of the United Nations, by agreement between the Security Council and Austria.

Article 33

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES

3. The forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and members of the Allied Commission for Austria shall be withdrawn from Austria as soon as possible and in any case within ninety days from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

